_ ------------------1 9 9 9 Thomson Lecture i\Iess.t,ec children are told that there are few careers for mathematicians -but nothing could be further from the truth. Far from closing career doors, mathematics training opens numerous doors. And it operis a range of doors that produce fascinating and challenging problems on which to work.
My intention here is to use my own career and the evolution of cryptography as a living example of how mathematics is being used, and to introduce you to some of the delightful areas of mathematics and engineering in which I have become involved.
Let me stress that mathematics is fun, exciting and challenging. Many people enjoy mathematics for its own sake, just like music and art. Indeed many mathematicians regard themselves more as artists than scientists. The fact that what they are doing may have useful applications is of no relevance whatsoever. When I first started doing research in mathematics this was certainly my attitude. The wonderful truth is that companies pay you to have fun, with the added satisfaction of seeing a product or service with which you have been involved actually being deployed and used.
The move into industry
After completing my PhD I took a post as a Research Assistant. During that time I followed an MSc course in Statistics while working on some data relating to patients' records at a psychiatric hospital (which obviously set me up for a career in industry). Then in 1977 I was approached by some head hunters working on behalf of Racal Electronics. I must say that when I first decided to move into industry many colleagues felt that I was selling out! It's rather interesting that the people at Racal who employed me -Ernest Harrison and Gerry Whent -knew they needed a mathematician, but really had no idea what that person would do. So they gave me an office, a budget and left me to get on with it. Six years later -after having done a part-time degree in electronic engineering, published two books, built up a mathematics department, commissioned that company's first computer system, and having made mathematics a fundamental aspect of both its equipment design and the sales cycle -I knew that industry was the place I wanted to be. It was somewhere where I could mix research and development, where I had the resource to make things happen, where numerous interesting mathematical problems lived and where I could enjoy working as part of a team. It was also hard work.
Cryptography
Perhaps I was just lucky because the problems that I was first given to work on were about communications security, i.e. cryptography. There was then almost no information on this subject in the public domain, and the reason was simple. If any keywords -like cryptography, encryption or ciphers -were identified in a paper, then a D-notice was immediately imposed on the paper and its publication was prohibited. However, two things happened in 1977 to change that situation. Firstly an algorithm intended to provide privacy for data was published. This was the data encryption algorithm. Apparently the US government believed that if they published an algorithm and made it available in the USA then it would stop people, particularly mathematicians and engineers, from working on the problem. Did they ever get that wrong?
The second thing that happened was the publication of an algorithm in response to an idea published in 1976. That idea came from Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. It was a simple but not obvious concept, and one for which they were unable then to develop a non-trivial example with all the properties they were seeking. They called this idea public key cryptography. The paper in 1977 described an algorithm that could satisfy the concept, based on a simple number theory developed in pure mathematics some 200 years earlier.
Conventional cryptography was based on the idea that a message would be enciphered under an algorithm, f say, determined in some way by a key, k. This would produce the ciphertext which would be the transmitted information. The recipient of this cipher could then input it to the deciphering algorithm together with the same key and be able to regenerate the message. So the security would rest on knowledge of the key. Now the practice in the '70s was to _ keep the algorithm secret although the system was designed on the assumption that an eavesdropper knew the algorithm but not the key. This assumption was important, since without it the only option would be to shoot the algorithm designer as soon as the system was implemented. The skill therefore with conventional systems was in designing the algorithms and then devising ways to transport the keys safely. Diffie & Hellman's concept was to question why the enciphering and deciphering keys should need to be the same.
The concept here depends on a complementary pair of algorithms, g and h, so that given the enciphering key, e, and knowledge of g and h, it is computationaIly infeasible to calculate d, the deciphering key. Now if I could devise such a system then I could publish the algorithms and my enciphering key and anyone could encrypt messages to send to me. But, provided that I kept my deciphering key secret, only I could decrypt these messages. So we could generate a directory with everyone's public encryption keys, and everyone could encrypt messages to send but only the person with the corresponding decryption key could read the messages.
However, there was one flaw. In my conventional system when I received a message that deciphered into something that made sense, I felt reasonably confident that it had come from a legitimate source because, assuming some redundancy in the message, it must have come from someone who knew our shared key. But in our public key system when I received a message it could have come from anyone with access to the directory. Diffie & Hellman also proposed a solution to this problem.
Digital signatures
Provided the enciphering and deciphering algorithms have the right properties, one can apply them in the reverse order, i.e. operate on the message with the deciphering key and deciphering algorithm. If the recipient using my public enciphering key can recover the message, then it must have come from someone who knew the secret deciphering key, i.e. me. So what we have just created is a method of providing digital signatures. Note however that this does not provide confidentiality. But if I sign with my secret key and encipher with the intended recipient's public key, then the recipient will be able to decrypt and check the authenticity of the message.
The first proposed algorithm that could provide encryption and signatures, and was not quickly discredited, came from Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. Hence known as RSA, it is based on first-year undergraduate mathematics.
The technique used is based on the properties of prime numbers. Unfortunately in 1977 for many potential applications it wasn't computationally feasible to make all the calculations to perform RSA in real-time. The size of numbers that one would need to use were then estimated to be some 200 decimal digits. So computations like raising one 200-decimal-digit number to the power of a similarly large number would have been needed. Even if there had been immediate agreement that the scheme was sound, there was not the technology to handle the size of numbers needed. In practice, therefore, it was only implementable for a few very specific types of system.
Although Diffie & Hellman were the first to publish the concept of public key cryptography and to discover the concept of the digital signature, and Rivest, Shamir & Adleman were the first to publish the RSA algorithm as a means to satisfy the concept, the principle of public key cryptography (under the name Non-Secret Encryption) and the RSA algorithm had been discovered some years earlier by a group of British mathematicians, including Ellis, Cocks and Williamson, at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham. They had not published their discovery because they were not allowed to -it was a government secret. Also they had concluded that although it was mathematically interesting it was not viable to be implemented.
Cipher systems
In 1977, while these developments in public key cryptography were happening in the USA, I had just begun working on the development of cipher systems in the UK. It was probably another year before I even became fully aware of their ideas. It has to be realised that there was then no community for cryptography because all public domain research had been discouraged and there was no Internet for discussion of ideas. But even if I had become aware earlier of the ideas and hence some of the potential in public key cryptography, it probably wouldn't have influenced me too much because the algOlithms couldn't have been implemented practically with the technology then available.
At that time I was working on some very different techniques that could be implemented by the technology we had. These were based on the use of shift registers, then a relatively new technology. Until then cryptography had been largely dominated by mechanical machines. Enigma, the system used by the Germans during WW2 and broken by the team at Bletchley Park, has been widely written about. Another -used by the Americans in the same period and by many other countries even into the '80s -was the M209.
With our first computer system in Racal-Comsec in 1979 I was able to develop a program that could break the M209, totally automatically, using pure ciphertext. In the first draft of 'Cipher Systems' with Fred Piper in 1980 -the first book ever published on this subject -we had a complete explanation and a copy of the program that could do this. I was eventually persuaded to omit the detailed explanation and remove the copy of the program on the grounds that it might damage security within those countries still using the M209 or a derivative.
Shift registers
The shift register was a basic component of most computers then. It is basically operated by a clock pulse input. Each time this happens the contents of each cell (i.e. binary I or 0) shift one place to the left. Thus the contents of the left-hand cell drop off the end and the right-hand cell is empty. We can then put into the right-hand cell some function of all the cells' contents. This is the feedback function which totally defines the next state of the register. So we have a finite state machine. The special case when the feedback function is linear defines a linear shift register, and with this one can relatively simply prove theorems and therefore make guarantees about the output -e.g. whether it looks random and what its periodicity will be.
To use this in a cipher one can take the output sequence, i.e. the bit falling off the left-hand end every time the shift register is pulsed, and modulo 2 add it to the next bit of the message. So we are adding a random-looking sequence to our data.
In this way the cipher is produced. The legitimate recipient can produce exactly the same sequence and, using the same operation, regenerate the message. So in a sense this technique emulates a one-time-pad -probably the only perfectly secure system -but of course it has a pseudo-random rather than random sequence.
Having broken almost all existing systems that I was shown, the challenge was then to design more robust systems. Clearly one had to introduce non-linearity and ensure that any solution based on linear methods was computationally infeasible. To introduce non-linearity there were two options: to use non-linear feedback; or to combine linear sequences in non-linear ways. Either way there were restrictions on how this might be achieved since, in practice, one had to use standard off-the-shelf components to keep the development costs down. One also had to avoid the trap of thinking that complexity alone achieved the result. So I spent a lot of time going through catalogues of available components and converting their functions into mathematical equations. A number of PhD theses emanated from this work as interest grew in the mathematics of what we were trying to achieve. And a highly successful Racal product range also emerged from it.
Speech scramblers
Another interesting set of mathematical problems arose at that time in the design of speech scramblers for use with low-bandwidth radio communications. I should explain that to transmit over long distance required low bandwidth which meant that, with the technology then available, the speech could not be adequately digitised. So the data encryption techniques just discussed could not be used. One had to scramble the analogue signal so that the signal bandwidth was not increased.
One of the problems in designing the scrambler was the remarkable ability of the human brain. The idea was to take 'chunks' of the speech signal and permute them. But to ensure that there was not too much delay between the person speaking and the person listening, one needed to use scrambling patterns. Remember how awful those delays used to be on trans-Atlantic telephone calls? Well the effect here was the same. So a maximum delay was needed, but the 'chunks' of speech also needed to be sufficiently separated otherwise the brain could work out what was being said. This of course results from the huge redundancy in speech communications. The issue, given a set of rules on the speech chunks' separation and the maximum acceptable delay, then becomes: will there be enough permutations available to prevent an interceptor from simply trying out all the permutations?
What we did was to develop a set of formulae which enabled us to calculate the number of permutations available for relatively large set values. In fact, even with the limited computer power we had then, we were able to work out what was needed for the MA4258. We also managed to prove a number of results regarding the number of 'good' permutations available for these types of scramblers, i.e. satisfying separation properties. 
Frequency-hopping
My next example is the development of JAGUAR, the first commercially available frequency-hopping radio. The idea behind frequency-hopping is that rather than transmit on a single frequency, the radio repeatedly changes frequency. This occurs at regular intervals according to some pattern determined by a pseudo-random number generator. The required property is that the pattern of frequencies used should be unpredictable. So, for example, a VHF frequencyhopping radio may use a large part of the VHF band for its hopping. The time spent on each frequency may vary, but will usually be short and typically just a few milliseconds.
The objectives behind frequency-hopping are to make it difficult for an opponent to 'jam' the communications and, of course, to stop them intercepting and understanding the communications. Given the redundancy of speech, and even with as much as 40% of the band blocked, a good frequency-hopping radio will still provide communication, although of rather awful quality. This means that an opponent needs to jam almost half the entire band before seriously inconve-136 Measurement + Control, Volume 33, June 2000 niencing the user. If the speech is also encrypted, the interceptor has the daunting task of finding all the constituent elements and piecing them togetherin addition to deciphering the information.
The cryptographic key for such systems therefore determines not only the encryption but also the hopping pattern. One of the most difficult design aspects of any such system is to devise a method of maintaining synchronisation between transmitter and receiver. So the frequency-hopper presents a number of interrelated problems for the mathematician.
Another interesting aspect is that such a radio can be designed not only for voice communication but also for data transmission. In the latter case, assuming an enemy is trying to 'jam' transmission, they will be blocking out parts of the band. So in trying to find a way of maintaining integrity of the information, we must assume that as well as the occasional 'random' error we are also dealing with an extreme case of burst errors. What is therefore needed is an error correcting code to deal with such situations.
It is worth reflecting here on the evolution of error correcting codes. Shannon published two famous papers: HA Mathematical Theory of Communication" in 1948; and "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" in 1949. Although the paper on cryptography was published after that on communications, what is often not realised is that the order in which he did the work was the other way around, but he had not been allowed to publish his work on cryptography until after the war. It was in fact his realisation that what made a cipher breakable was redundancy in the language that led him to conclude that by adding redundancy to a message he could 'correct' transmission errors and recover a message.
So the challenge was to find a means of adding redundancy so that burst errors could be handled. The solution was the same as that adopted later for a much more common medium -namely COs. The particular code we applied was the Reed-Solomon code.
In 1982 we were invited to present the Spring Lecture at the Royal School of Signals. We did a live demonstration with two connected JAGUARs and then added random errors in the path as well as jamming channels. A spectrum analyser was also connected in the path so that the audience could see the amount of the band that was jammed. We then slowly increased the number of jammed channels and the number of random·errors. From memory we were able to jam more than 65% of the spectrum and still receive error-free data at rates of some 1200 bits per second.
Those were also the first days of digital signal processing chips and we were able to show early examples of how the receiver could signal back its success and the transmitter could then, in real time, adapt its data rates accordingly. Again what was needed for this was the implementation of mathematical algorithms both to assess the situation and to take decisions.
It's hard to convey the excitement that accompanies such demonstrations. When a system is designed it's one thing being able to prove that it should work, but it is so exciting and something of a relief to actually see the system working and doing exactly what had been theoretically predicted.
Secure payment systems
In parallel with some of the developments described, I had also become involved with the UK banks on the security requirements for payment systems.
I believe that the work we did with the banks during the '70s and '80s did a lot to shape the whole evolution of secure payment systems. And while on occasions there has been criticism of the lack of security within financial systems, I believe the UK banks have largely behaved very responsibly even if their public and client relations have not always been so well handled. This, I believe, has contributed significantly to the strong position that London has maintained in the finance industry. The Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS), for instance, was arguably one of the first systems in the world to use public key cryptography -now termed a public key infrastructure (PKI).
My particular example from this sector is the evolution of EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Transfer from the Point of Sale). The problem as stated in the late '70s was to devise a cipher system that could be built into a terminal that would be left in merchant premises, many of which may be very open to vandalism or theft, i.e. a garage forecourt. Until then the banks had felt, rightly or wrongly, a level of security in that all electronic payment terminals were under their direct control (i.e. in their branches or built into the walls of their branches).
One danger, for example, was that someone might record a month's transactions from the terminal, perhaps including people's PINs (albeit encrypted), account details, etc, and then steal a terminal, deduce the key, decrypt the information and use this to withdraw money from legitimate cardholders' accounts. The requirement, therefore, was to ensure that no long-term key was resident in the terminal.
The technique that we devised later became known as the Transaction Key or UKPT (Unique Key Per Transaction). Briefly it was based on the concept of one-way functions, i.e. functions where it is easy to go one way but computationally infeasible to go the other way. The simplest example is a telephone directory. Given a name, it's easy to look up the number. But given the number, looking up the name is more difficult! In this case one could of course build a reverse look-up table, but if I could choose a function such that the reverse look-up was too big for any computer then I would have, in practice, a one-way function.
The idea behind the Transaction Key technique was to ensure that a key would only be used for one transaction; and that if you could get hold of a key, it would only allow you to read one transaction. So you would have to do the equivalent to breaking the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA), the de facto banking cipher, to be able to read any other past or future transaction. It provably removed all dependence on long-term keys. Thus if you broke into the terminal, were able to read all the information contained and then put it back in place, we could prove that no matter how much information you recorded, you would still have to do an amount of work equal to breaking the DEA to read any single future or past transaction. The corollary was that it also made it easy to initialise a terminal in the field because you could start with all known values in the terminal and it would sort itself out. This significantly eased the problem of managing secret keys.
As a result the technique was very attractive to banks. The Transaction Key and its subsequent variants became the basis of EFTPOS standards around the world. And I am very proud of an award for an outstanding contribution by the American National Standards Institute for my work on the Transaction Key, which forms the basis of American National Standard X9.24.
During the last decade, the technology needed for public key cryptography has caught up with the mathematics. Not only do we now have all the types of techniques described here, but we also have the ability to implement public key cryptography with large numbers.
The concept of setting up public directories, once considered as a nice mathematical idea, is now becoming a reality. Today's Microsoft and Netscape browsers support the technology to allow us all to use these techniques.
Our brave new virtual world
The revolution that we are currently undergoing is extraordinary. I am sure that when people look back in a few hundred years, they will see the Industrial Revolution as a mere blip by comparison with what we are experiencing today. Concepts like digital certificates and digital signatures will in the next few years replace 3000 years of evolution, based on the value of a written signature, with an entire framework based on a mathematical function. Indeed the entire electronic global economy of our future will be based on mathematics.
Mathematics at work
The Institute of Mathematics and Its Applications has initiated a project to raise public awareness of the importance of mathematics within our society. The opportunities for people with mathematical training are enormous. We must as a society encourage people with the talent to study mathematics to do so.
The o Distribution of the CD-ROM to some 7,500 schools, colleges and careers advisors. It is also hoped to make it available in kiosks at places like the Science Museum, libraries, etc.
